Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International Patent Harmonization. by McCalman, P.




WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS





Research School of Social Sciences
Australian National University
WORKING PAPER NO. 374
June 1999
ISBN: 08631 374 2
* E-mail: mccalman@coombs.anu.edu.au. Tel: +61 2 6249 3881 / Fax: +61 2 6249
0182.
I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Andrew W. Mellon
Foundation and the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. I would also like to
thank Sam Kortum, Jonathan Eaton, Josh Ederington, Wolfgang Keller, Dan
Trefler, Marc rysman and especially Bob Staiger for their helpful comments. All
remaining errors are my own.Abstract
This paper extends analysis of the GATT Uruguay Round by quantifying the impact of
international patent harmonization as implied by the TRIPs agreement. Patent
harmonization has the capacity to generate large transfers of income between countries,
the US being the major beneficiary. Developing countries are major contributors to these
transfers, but Canada, the UK and Japan also make sizable contributions. Furthermore,
the increase in dead weight loss from higher standards of patent protection undermines
the aggregate benefits of the Uruguary Round package, with this increase amounting to as
much as one fifth of the efficiency gains from trade liberalization.
JEL classification: 034, F43
Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, International AgreementsAustralian National University
Faculty of Economics and Commerce
and
Economics Program
Research School of Social Sciences
WORKING PAPERS IN
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS
REAPING WHAT YOU SOW:




Research School of Social Sciences
Australian National University
WORKING PAPER NO. 374
June 1999
ISBN: 08631 374 2Reaping What You Sow:
An Empirical Analysis of International Patent Harmonization
Phillip McCalman*
Economics Program
Research School of Social Sciences
The Australian National University
Abstract
This paper extends analysis of the GATT Uruguay Round by quantifying the impact of
international patent harmonization as implied by the TRIPs agreement.  Patent harmonization
has the capacity to generate large transfers of income between countries, the US being the
major beneficiary.  Developing countries are major contributors to these transfers, but Canada,
the UK and Japan also make sizable contributions.  Furthermore, the increase in dead weight
loss from higher standards of patent protection undermines the aggregate benefits of the
Uruguay Round package, with this increase amounting to as much as one fifth of the efficiency
gains from trade liberalization.
JEL Calssification:  O34, F43
Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, International Agreements
* 0200  ACT  Australia
Email: mccalman@coombs.anu.edu.au Telephone: +61 2 6249 3881 Fax: +61 2 6249 0182 .
 I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and
the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.  I would also like to thank Sam Kortum,
Jonathan Eaton, Josh Ederington, Wolfgang Keller, Dan Trefler, Marc Rysman and especially
Bob Staiger for their helpful comments.  All remaining errors are my own.2
The decision to foster technological innovations through policy instruments such as patents
involves a trade-off between the rents appropriated by an inventor and the dead weight loss
associated with granting an exclusive right to use the new technology.  At the national level,
culture, history and level of economic development condition preferences relating to this
trade-off.  However, the most important innovations rarely impact just a single country.
Consequently, international attitudes regarding this trade-off shape an innovators incentive to
conduct research and development.  It is the recognition of this fact which underlies the long
history of efforts to co-ordinate patent policy at the international level.
Until recently the primary agreement relating to the international aspects of intellectual
property rights was the Paris Convention of 1883.  This convention established a system in
which inventors could access patent institutions in other countries on terms no less favorable
than the terms available to the nationals of those countries.  While such access provided an
opportunity to appropriate rents from an invention in more than one country, only minimal
structures were placed on the form of the patent institutions with these details left up to
individual countries.  Such flexibility lead to a diverse set of international standards.
Moreover, if a country failed to honor even the minimal discipline imposed by the Paris
Convention, very little could be done since the agreement contained no formal dispute
settlement institution.
Frustrated by an inability to appropriate adequate rents from innovations, technology-
exporting countries (US, EU and Japan) lobbied to have intellectual property rights included
on the agenda of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.  The end result of these
negotiations was the agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights3
(TRIPs).   The obligations contained within the TRIPs agreement represent a major change in
international consensus concerning patents and intellectual property rights.  In contrast to the
Paris Convention, the TRIPs agreement imposes minimum standards on the form of patent
protection, with these standards either in-line with or exceeding the practices of most
industrialized countries.  In addition, the agreement also establishes a dispute settlement
mechanism to enforce these minimum standards.
Previous work has examined the rationale extending the disciplines of the international patent
system beyond those of the Paris Convention.
1  It has been concluded that without extra
discipline countries tend to adopt standards of protection below those of a social planner, with
the difference due to the externalities individual countries experience when evaluating the
benefits of patent protection.  However, in characterizing the set of patents that achieve the
globally efficient level of innovation, it emerges that there are infinitely many sets of patent
standards that are consistent with global efficiency if countries experience the same
proportional dead weight loss.  Under these conditions a social planner is not concerned with
the source of funds, just the level of funds an inventor needs to appropriate in order to be
induced to undertake the optimal level of innovation.  While patent harmonization across
countries is an element of the efficient set, the harmonization embodied by the TRIPs
agreement requires substantial policy changes for a number of countries, with the largest
changes required by the lesser developed countries.  This asymmetric policy reform program
and the implied redistribution of income between countries, has raised concerns over the
distributional consequences of the TRIPs agreement.
Despite these concerns, a view has emerged that developing countries, and more generally4
technology importing countries, will gain substantially from the Uruguay Round package - any
losses which these countries experience from patent harmonization will be more than offset by
the gains from market access in other areas (Chin and Grossman (1990), Maskus (1990), Eby-
Konan et. al. (1995) and Gruen et. al. (1996)).  However, no detailed analysis of the TRIPs
agreement has yet been conducted with much of what is known about the international
aspects of intellectual property rights drawn from surveys of the owners of intellectual
property.  For example, the USITC (1988) reported that in response to a 1986 survey, 269
respondents estimated aggregate worldwide losses as a result of inadequate protection of all
intellectual property at $23.8 billion in 1986.  However, incentives to exaggerate the losses
undermine the credibility of such survey evidence.
In contrast, this paper estimates a structural model of innovation in an international setting to
analyze the implications of the TRIPs agreement, with particular attention paid to its
implication for patent protection.  The structural model allows the value of patent rights held
by 29 countries to be estimated and provides a basis for the examination of how the value of
these rights are affected by patent harmonization.  These estimates are derived from an
modified version of the model set out in Eaton and Kortum (1996).  The basic framework
relates innovations to productivity growth through a quality ladders model with the source of
innovations (domestic or foreign) related to patent applications.  Importantly, the decision to
seek a patent is modeled as one that is taken by a profit maximizing inventor, with a patent
sought only in those countries which provide patent protection and whose protection is
sufficiently valuable to warrant paying the cost of a patent.
A important feature of this paper is that it models the relationship between the value of patent5
rights and both the scope of patent protection and the enforcement institutions offered by a
country.  By incorporating this level of detail, the model identifies the relationship between
patent institutions and the rents associated with patent protection.  Estimation of this
relationship then enables the counterfactual experiment to be conducted in which all countries
adopt standards consistent with the TRIPs agreement.  This allows inferences to be drawn on
the international redistribution of income due to the TRIPs agreement, and the size of the
increase in dead weight loss associated with strengthening patent protection to be calculated.
What emerges from this analysis is a picture of patent protection as an important method for
appropriating the rents of an invention.  Although it is not the primary method of rent
appropriation,  patent harmonization nevertheless has the capacity to generate large transfers
of income between countries.  The US is the major beneficiary with a net increase in the
present value of patent rights of $4.5 billion (1988 dollars) on the patents applied for in 1988.
Although developing countries contribute to these transfers, Canada ($1 billion), UK ($0.5
billion) and Japan ($0.5 billion) also make sizable contributions.  These transfers significantly
alter the perceived distribution of benefits from the Uruguay Round, with the benefits of the
US substantially enhanced, while those of developing countries and Canada considerably
diminished.  The overall benefit of the Uruguay Round package is also undermined once the
increase in dead weight loss is included.  The increase in dead weight loss from higher
standards of patent protection generates an increase in the present value of world wide dead
weight loss of $17.5 billion (1988 dollars) on patents applied for in 1988, which amounts to as
much as one fifth of the efficiency gains associated with the trade liberalization benefits of the
Uruguay Round.6
1.  Calculation of Patent Values
The object of this study is to estimate the relationship between the value of patent rights and
national patent institutions.  However, a major difficulty arises in this calculation since patent
rights are rarely traded.  As a result, data on transactions which would allow the value of
patent rights to be directly observed does not exist.  Consequently, any attempt at assessing
the value of patent rights must be based on some method of imputation.
There appear to be at least two feasible methods for deriving the value of patent protection.
One is set out in Pakes and Schankerman (1984), and exploits data on the annual renewal of
patent rights.  This approach attempts to fit a return function which generates renewal
proportions as closely as possible to the observed proportions, conditional on a patent having
been taken out.  This method has now been used to estimate the value of patent protection in a
number of countries (such as France, Germany, UK, Scandinavia and India).  However, the
prospect of extending this approach to evaluate the international patent system is constrained
by the fact that the US did not charge renewal fees prior to 1982.
An alternative approach to gauging the value of patent protection is contained in Eaton and
Kortum (1996).  The primary purpose of their model is to decompose the contribution that
foreign and domestic innovations make to a country’s productivity growth.  In their
framework international patenting provides information on the origin and diffusion of
innovations.  By assuming that this data is consistent with optimizing behavior of the
inventors, inferences can be drawn about the size of innovations.  It is the step size of an
invention that an inventor uses to calculate the expected value of an invention and7
consequently the merit of patent protection.  The estimated parameters allow these
calculations to be reconstructed, revealing the value of patent protection.
While the study of Eaton and Kortum implies a method for quantifying the value of patent
protection, this was not the focus of their work.  Instead they employed the model to conduct
a growth accounting exercise for 19 OECD countries, finding that (except for the US) growth
is largely determined by research done elsewhere.  In contrast, this paper specifically examines
the role that patent institutions play in determining the value of patent rights for both
developed and developing countries.  To derive these values, Eaton and Kortum’s framework
is modified in two key respects.
First, the model is extended to incorporate a fuller description of national patent institutions.
Eaton and Kortum summarize the institutional characteristics of each country by employing a
single summary measure as developed by Rapp and Rozek (1990).  While there is some
variation in the patent institutions of the countries considered by Eaton and Kortum, a single
summary measure would seem appropriate for a relatively homogeneous group (such as the
OECD).  However, when considering countries with a more varied structure of intellectual
property protection, this index becomes inadequate and the parameter estimates are subject to
omitted variables bias. To overcome this problem, a range of variables are used to describe
national institutions.  These variables provide detailed information about patent institutions by
summarizing the extent of coverage offered (e.g. are any sectors excluded from patent
protection?), restrictions on the form of exploitation of patents (e.g. do imports satisfy
working requirements?) and the availability of enforcement institutions (injunctions, burden of
proof, etc.).  Aside from mitigating omitted variables bias, a disaggregated specification can be8
mapped directly into the changes implied by the TRIPs agreement, allowing a  counterfactual
experiment to be conducted.
A second modification to the model is a simplification of the structure underlying the
innovation production function.  Eaton and Kortum utilize data on the employment of research
scientists and engineers to proxy the flow of innovations.  However, such data is not available
for a large number of countries.  This problem can be circumvented by using dummy variables
to account for differences in the level of inventiveness between countries. By simplifying the
model in this way, a relatively large and diverse sample of countries can be constructed.
2. The Model
Following Eaton and Kortum (1996), a quality ladders model of productivity growth is
employed.
2  In any country, output is produced by combining a given set of intermediate
inputs, subject to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:







where Y is quantity of output, X(j) is the quantity of input j, Z(j) is the quality of input j, and J
is an index of the range of inputs.  Output is assumed to be homogeneous and tradable across
countries, while inputs are non-traded.  The range of inputs, J, is assumed to be fixed and the
same across countries.
3  Units are chosen so that the production of input j at rate x requires
local labor services at rate x.
The expansion of output over time is related to improvements in the quality of inputs.  To
measure this improvement, the following is used as an index of the aggregate level of9
technology in country n:
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The improvement in the quality of an input is described by the step size of the invention, with
an invention of size q applicable to input j raising the quality of that input from Z(j) to Z(j)’ =
e
qZ(j).
An important aspect of the model is that an innovation can come from either domestic or
foreign inventors.  If an invention comes from abroad, then the quality of the invention is
scaled up or down depending upon the relative technology positions of the source and
recipient countries.  Specifically, it is assumed that the step size of an innovation is a random





















and the catch up parameter, w, is assumed to be strictly greater than zero.  The
average step size of an invention employed in country n, but originating in country i, is then
equal to 1/qni.  Since the process of research and development (R&D) is not directly modeled,
it is assumed that the type of input to which an invention applies is a draw from a uniform
distribution on [0, J].
The model incorporates two further parameters that describe the production of inventions and
the diffusion of technology.  It is assumed that country i produces a flow of inventions at a
rate ai, with the probability of an invention from country i diffusing to country n given by eni.
Given the structure of the model, the steady state involves each country growing at a common10
rate (i.e. gn = g).  In addition, Eaton and Kortum show that under their assumptions about
market structure there is a proportional relationship between labor productivity and the






P n n ” = G .  With the factor of proportionality a function of ai, eni
and qni.  The inclusion of this equation in the subsequently estimated system ensures that the
estimated value of patent protection is in line with observed labor productivity growth.
3. The Patenting Decision
The above provides a description of the general environment in which inventors operate.
However, whether or not an invention is patented depends upon two further elements, market
structure and national patent institutions.  Market structure determines the potential strategic
advantage associated with an innovation, and therefore determines the flow of rents that an
inventor may appropriate.  In turn, national patent institutions dictate the ability of an inventor
to reap these strategic advantages.  At this point it is important to recognize that patents are
only one of a number of ways that innovators use to appropriate rents from an innovation.
4
Consequently, patent protection is modeled as extending the expected duration of the flow of
rents an innovator receives, rather than as the sole determinant of an innovators tenure as
technological leader.
Suppliers of intermediate inputs are assumed to engage in Bertrand style competition under
constant returns to scale technology.  An innovator takes advantage of this competitive
behavior by charging a price for the right to use the innovation (which may or may not be
patented) that leaves the input suppliers just willing to use the new technology.  In this way
the owner of the invention can extract rents surrounding the innovation.  Using the Cobb-11
Douglas structure the instantaneous rents extracted by the owner of an invention of size q are
given by pn(q) = (1 - e
-q)Yn/J .
An inventor earns rents generated by an invention in a country as long as it has diffused there
and has been neither imitated nor rendered obsolete by a more advanced technology.  The
hazard of imitation depends in part on whether the invention has been patented in that country.
The protection afforded by a patent, in turn, depends on the strength of national institutions.
Let ini
pat denote the hazard of imitation if an invention is patented, while ini
not is the hazard of
imitation without a patent.  It is assumed that an inventor appropriates rents from the use of
their technology in a foreign country through a licensing agreement.  Licensing is assumed to
involve the licensee paying (e
q-1)wn for each unit of intermediate good produced until the
expiration of the patent.
5  Under such a contract the marginal cost of the licensee is e
qwn.  This
implies that when facing a local imitator, with the two firms competing Bertrand style, the
licensee produces nothing and the imitator satisfies local demand under a limit pricing strategy.
Consequently, the inventor’s rents fall to zero when a technology is imitated.
Aside from the risk of imitation, inventors also face the possibility that their technology will be
surpassed by new inventions.  This hazard of obsolescence depends upon the rate at which
innovations flow into a country and the probability that they apply to a particular industry,










e a   (3)12
In assessing the benefits of patent protection an inventor compares the expected present value
of the invention both with a patent (less any costs of obtaining the patent) and without.  To
analyze the decision, consider the expected value at time t of an invention from country i of
size q that has diffused to country n, V q ni( ).  Assuming constant rates of imitation and



















where r is the discount rate which is assumed to be constant overtime and k ˛ {pat, not}
depending on whether or not the invention has been patented.
A patent gives the inventor the incremental benefits of a lower hazard of imitation, so is worth




ni - .  Hence, an inventor from country i will seek patent protection in country n
if the value of patent protection in country n exceeds the costs of obtaining a patent, Cni.
Since the incremental value of patent protection is increasing in the step size of the invention,
q, the following implicitly defines a quality threshold,  ni q , above which all inventions are
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The fraction of inventions which diffuse from country i to country n that are patented in
country n, fni, can now be determined by combining the cut-off quality with the distribution
function for the inventive step.
fni = Pr[Q >  ni q ] = 
ni niq e
q -  =  1-


























Note in particular that the more effective the national patent institutions are at lowering the
hazard of imitation, the higher is the fraction of inventions that are profitable to patent.
The reduction in the hazard of imitation due to patent protection is assumed to be related to
the  modes of legal redress that an inventor can access.  Specifically, it is assumed that patent
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(6)
where PGn is an index describing national enforcement institutions adapted from Park and
Ginarte (1997).  In contrast to Eaton and Kortum, this specification allows the hazard of
imitation to depend on whether the innovation being patented is of domestic or foreign origin.
This is achieved by incorporating additional information on the hazard of imitation of non-
patented innovations.
6  Note also that since the index employed is continuous, this
specification allows for the estimation of one domestic and one foreign hazard of imitation rate
associated with patents for each country, for a total of fifty eight, in contrast to Eaton and
Kortum’s two.
Given the flow of inventions from country i, ai, the fraction of these that diffuse to country n,
eni, and the fraction of these which it pays to patent, fni, the number of patents taken out in
country n by inventors located in country i, Pni, would then be given by Pni = aienifni.    This
derivation assumes that once an invention has diffused to another country the only relevant
factor determining patenting behavior is the size of the innovation.  However, a number of
countries either exclude from patentability inventions in a particular field or require that the
patents be worked within the country.  It is therefore possible that inventions that satisfy the14
quality threshold are nonetheless not patented.  To capture this possibility, the model is
augmented by a parameter representing the scope of patent protection, sni.  This parameter is
assumed to enter the bi-lateral patenting equation in a multiplicative manner.
 7  The scope
parameter is interpreted as the fraction of inventions of patentable quality that are also
applicable to an industry which is covered by patent protection.
The motivation for including extra information on the scope of patent protection is twofold.
First, one of the major changes required by the TRIPs agreement is that patent protection be
offered to all inventions without regard to country of origin or how the patent is exploited.
Therefore, by including information on the scope of protection, the impact of this broadening
of patent protection can be directly assessed.  The second motivation is to overcome the
possibility of omitted variables bias.  The potential for this bias to arise is related to Eaton and
Kortum’s assumption that the role of national patent institutions affect patenting decisions
solely through reductions in the hazard of imitation.  However, if otherwise profitable patents
are not taken out because they are excluded from patentability, then the estimated hazard rate
for a patent will be biased upward.  This will tend to understate the consequences of patent
harmonization.  Both of these reasons suggest that the scope of patent protection plays an
important role in the operation of the patent system and needs to be incorporated directly into
the model.
The scope of patent protection, sni, is assumed to determine the fraction of high quality
innovations that receive patent protection.  This fraction is directly related to the industries
that a country excludes from patent protection.  In addition many countries specify that patent
protection brings with it an obligation to undertake production that employs the new15
technology within the country granting the patent.  This restriction may deter inventors of high
quality innovations from taking out a patent, preferring instead to serve that market by
exports.
8  It is also the case that the scope of patent protection can effect source countries
differently.  For example, a country which itself excludes chemicals from patent protection is
unlikely to have an active R&D sector in chemicals.
9  In this situation, the bi-lateral scope of
patent protection between two countries that both exclude chemicals is higher than the scope
of protection for a country which covers chemicals but its bi-lateral partner does not.  This
effect is captured by the interaction terms for the sectoral dummies in the specification set out
in (8).
It is the combination of excluded industries and working requirements that is taken to define
the scope of patent protection offered by a country.  To capture the variation in institutional
arrangements, the following relates the scope of patent protection to national policies:
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where the D’s represent dummy variables that take on the value of one if patent protection is
not provided in the pharmaceutical (ph), food (fd) and chemical (ch) industries or if there is a







wr are parameters to be estimated.  To get a feel for how this specification of scope





ch= 0 (i.e. both countries provide patent
protection in the food products and chemical industries and neither imposes a working
requirement), so that sni = (1 - s
phDn
ph(1 - Di
ph)).  Now if Dn
ph = Di
ph= 1 the effective scope of
protection afforded inventors from country i in country n is 1.   However, if Di
ph=0, then the
effective scope of protection is (1 - s
ph) < 1.  Therefore, the exclusion of an industry from
patent protection or the imposition of a working requirement leads to a proportional reduction16
in the number of patents sought in country n by inventors in country i.
Taking into account the scope of patent protection bi-lateral patenting is described by
Pni = aienifnisni  (7)
Bi-lateral patenting is then the result of the following process of elimination.  Country i
generates a flow of ai inventions which diffuse to country n with probability eni.  A fraction of
these diffused inventions, fni, are of a sufficiently high quality to make patenting profitable,
with this fraction being higher the more effective are the national patent institutions at
lowering the hazard of imitation.  However, only a fraction, sni, will apply to industries which
are covered by patent protection.  The inventions that survive this filtering process are the
ones that are ultimately patented.
4. Empirical Implementation
The above parameters of the theoretical model can be estimated by assuming that the data is
generated by steady state equilibrium.  The two basic equations investigated are the bi-lateral
patenting equation and the labor productivity equation:
Pni = aienifnisni
y A n n n = G
These two equations are jointly estimated in order to impose the restriction that patenting
behavior, and the implied patent values, are consistent with productivity growth.
10
To estimate this system assume that the bi-lateral patenting equation is subject to a
multiplicative error, uni, which is taken to be independently and identically distributed with a
variance of su
2.  This implies the following empirical relationship:17
Pni = aienifnisnie
uni
As noted in Eaton and Kortum, a difficulty arises in estimating this equation when the
predicted fraction of patentable inventions hits zero.  In this situation the model should fit
perfectly.  Following Eaton and Kortum it is assumed that a fraction of inventions h that are
not worth patenting (i.e. involve a step size below  ni q ) are patented by mistake.
11  The bi-
lateral patenting equation then becomes:
Pni = aieni[fni  +(1- fni)h]snie
uni (9)
Consider next the relationship between labor productivity and the technology index.  To gain a
measure of this index, the dynamic system is solved with the eigenvector yielding the implicit
value of the technology index.  However, since the eigenvector is only defined up to a scalar
multiple, the model only has implications for relative productivity levels.  Hence the following
relative productivity equation is estimated:












where each country’s productivity is measured relative to that of the US.  It is assumed that
the error, nn, is independently and identically distributed with a variance of sn
2.
5. Data
The sample consists of 29 countries, a mix of both developing and industrialized countries.
This provides 841 bi-lateral patenting observations and 28 relative labor productivity
observations.  Table 1 provides a list of the countries along with some summary statistics.
The dependent variables are bi-lateral patenting of inventions from country i in country n’s
market, Pni, and country n’s productivity relative to that of the US, yn/yN.  The patent variable18
is patent applications by reporting country and country of residence of the inventor for 1988.
These data are taken primarily from WIPO (1990), with additional data obtained directly from
WIPO.
12  Table 1 summarizes the full matrix of patenting.
13  The productivity variable is real
GDP per worker, averaged over 1986-88, from Summers and Heston (1991) in 1988 dollars.
The explanatory variables governing the return to patenting relate primarily to data on national
patent institutions.  Data on the scope of patent protection is taken from WIPO (1988) and
Baxter and Sinott (1989).  These data consist of dummy variables taking on a value of unity if
a sector is excluded from patent protection and zero otherwise.  The sectors most subject to
exclusion are pharmaceuticals (D
ph), foods (D
fd) and chemicals (D
ch).  In addition, some
countries do not consider importation of products as consistent with the exploitation of patent
rights and impose a domestic working requirement (D
wr).  The value of these dummy variables
are listed in Table 1.
Once a patent has been obtained, its exploitation is dependent on the national enforcement
institutions that protect a patent holder from imitators.  Recall that patent enforcement is given
by (6) and enters (9) through fni.  Information on these institutions is contained in an index
adapted from Park and Ginarte (1997), that has a range from zero to five (PGn).  This index
summarizes information on the availability of injunctions, prosecution for contributory
infringement, the possibility of criminal prosecution, the burden of proof procedures and the
duration of patent protection.
14  The cost of applying for a patent, (Cni), which includes official
application fees, agent’s fees and translation fees, are constructed from Helfgott (1993).
Recall that Cni enters (9) through the definition of fni.  These costs range from a minimum of
$460 in India, for an application which does not require translation to English, to $4,772 in19
Japan, which does require translation.  GNP taken from the World Bank (Yn) scales these costs
(see (5)).  The modeling of diffusion follows that of Eaton and Kortum (for the exact
specification, see the Appendix).  Data on the determinants of diffusion are distance in
kilometers, KMni, bi-lateral imports as a share of GNP, IMni, (IMF (various years)) and human
capital, HKn, (Barro and Lee (1996)).
15
Finally, a number of parameters have been pre-determined due to difficulties in identifying all
the parameters of the model.  These are domestic and foreign imitation rates of non-patented
technology( , ) i i dom
not
for
not   , the real rate of interest (r) and the growth rate (g).  The foreign
imitation rate of non-patented material is based on estimates of Mansfield and Romeo (1980)
about the rate at which technology “leaks out” from US firms to non-US competitors.  This
hazard rate is set at 0.25.  Comparable numbers for the domestic market are reported in
Mansfield (1985), which imply a domestic hazard of imitation of 0.8.
16  Finally, the model is
solved to attain a steady-state growth rate of 2.8%, which is the average of the countries in the
sample over the period 1985-90, and the real interest rate is set at 7%.
17
6. Parameter Estimates
Table 2 contains the parameter estimates.  All the parameters are significant except for the
catch up parameter, w, and the scope parameters for the exclusion from patent protection of
the chemical and pharmaceutical industries , s
ch and s
ph.  Taking account of the differences in
the size of the sample and the characterization of national patent institutions, the remaining
parameters generally conform to those found by Eaton and Kortum.
Turning to the role of patent institutions, the scope variables reveal that restrictions on both20
sectoral coverage of patents and how they are worked has a substantial impact on patenting
behavior.  For example, a country which excludes pharmaceuticals, foods and chemicals from
patenting while requiring that the remaining patents be worked locally, reduces the number of
patents taken out in their economy on a bi-lateral basis by 80% compared to a situation where









The parameter on the index of enforcement institutions, g, shows that these institutions also
play a significant role.  This parameter implies that the most stringent enforcement institutions
lower the risk of imitation by 10% compared to a non-patented outcome (calculated using
equation (6)).  However, to fully appreciate the role of patent institutions, the present value of
protection that is offered by these institutions needs to be derived (not just the impact on the
hazard of imitation).
7. Patents and Rent Appropriation
A major concern associated with the adoption of the TRIPs agreement is that technology-
importing countries are likely to be exploited by the owners of technology.  However, studies
of the utilization of the patent system reveal that patent protection is not the sole method used
to appropriate the benefits from an invention.  Other appropriation strategies based on secrecy,
lead time, learning curves and sales/service efforts have all been identified as prominent
determinants of the ability to appropriate rents.
18  This suggests that any analysis of the TRIPs
agreement must attempt to isolate the role of patent protection in rent appropriation, or risk
overestimating the role of patents in rent appropriation.
1921
The parameter estimates reported in Table 2 are used to derive the private value of patent
protection based on the institutions which were in place prior to the TRIPs agreement.  This
value is defined as the increase in the present value of rents accruing to the inventor due to the
lower hazard of imitation associated with patent protection, conditional on the estimated flow
of innovations.  Calculation of this quantity involves a comparison of the present value of rents




ni - , with these
values derived from (4)).  The value of patent protection is then the present value of the
incremental rents that an inventor appropriates from their extended tenure as technology
leader due to the lower hazard of imitation associated with patent protection.
At the bi-lateral level, the private value of patent protection is calculated by multiplying the
mean present value of patent rights by the number of patent applications.  Combining the
exponential distribution of the quality of the invention and the quality threshold for profitable
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The empirical model also allows for the possibility that a certain fraction of inventions with a
step size below qni are also patented in country n by residents of country i.  The mean present
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Hence, the aggregate present value of rents appropriated from patents in country n held by
inventors in country i is given by:
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Table 3 reports these values aggregated to give the present value of patent rights applied for in
1988 under the pre-TRIPs system for each country.  The most striking feature of this column
is the value of rights held by US residents.  The aggregate value of US owned patent rights are
not only calculated to be greater than any other country’s, but are in fact greater than all other
countries taken as a whole.  With such a stake in the patent system it is not surprising that the
US has played such an active role in its reform.
Table 4 helps to put these numbers into perspective and provides a check on their plausibility.
The first column provides a general measure of the importance of patent protection, by
comparing the present value of patent rights to R&D expenditures by business enterprises.
20
This ratio provides a measure of the importance of patent protection as a rent appropriating
mechanism.  For example, with free entry into the R&D market we would expect this ratio to
be approximately one if patents represented the sole source of rent appropriation.  With no
country recouping more than a quarter of R&D expenditures through patent protection (see
the first column of Table 4), these predictions are in line with qualitative work which suggests
that patents are not the primary method used by inventors to appropriate rents (Levin et. al.
(1987)).  They are also similar to predictions from patent renewal models which report ratios
with a close resemblance to those in the first column for France, Germany and the UK (see
Lanjouw (1993), Schankerman (1991), Pakes (1986) and Pakes and Schankerman (1986)).
These ratios are also consistent with survey evidence for the US which finds that patents tend23
to raise imitation costs by a median of 11% (Mansfield et. al. (1981)).  Schankerman (1991)
interprets this 11% as an approximate return to a patent holder.  This is derived by assuming
that without a patent, entry based on the new technology will occur until normal profits are
made.  However, if a patent raises the entry costs of the imitators by 11%, then the patent
holder will be able to make pure profits by avoiding these extra costs.  The estimated return
for the US is 15%, with a standard error of 2.3%, and 11% falls within the associated
confidence interval.
The ranking in the first column of Table 4, which shows the most developed countries (US,
France, Germany, UK and Italy) rely on the patent system more than less-developed countries
(India, Mexico, Korea, and Portugal), also seems plausible.  Such a ranking is consistent with
the notion that R&D efforts of less developed countries are directed primarily towards
adaptive ends rather than purely innovative ends (Evenson (1984)).  However, two elements
of this ranking are somewhat surprising, the low ranking of Japan and the highest ranking of
Switzerland.  As noted in Footnote 13,  an adjustment was made to the number of domestic
patents that the Japanese apply for.  This adjustment is a crude way of dealing with the
idiosyncratic patenting behavior of the Japanese, with an associated tendency to distort the
value of Japanese held patent rights if it is incorrect.  On the other hand, the highest ranking of
Switzerland does seem a plausible result.  Nearly 50% of Swiss business R&D expenditures
are devoted to chemicals and drugs, in comparison to only 10% for the US.  Given the higher
than average reliance of chemical and drug firms on patents to appropriate rents (Mansfield
(1986)), this suggests that the Swiss ranking is indeed appropriate.
As a final check on the calculated size and distribution of the value of patent rights under the24
pre-TRIPs system, the second column of Table 4 provides a breakdown between the rents
appropriated from the domestic market and foreign markets.  As is to be expected, all but the
largest countries appropriate most of their rents from abroad.
21  The breakdown for the US is
particularly encouraging, given that Mansfield et. al. (1979) find that approximately one third
of the returns to US R&D projects are expected to come from abroad.  Taken together, the
evidence presented in Table 4 suggests that the approach adopted in this paper captures
important elements of what is known about the value and distribution of patent rights under
the pre-TRIPs system of patent protection.
Since the estimated parameters contain information on how inventors respond to different
institutional settings when evaluating patent protection, this framework can be used to address
the question:  What are the transfers of income between countries implied by the TRIPs
agreement?  This question can be answered by setting the institutional parameters in line with
those required by the TRIPs agreement.  It should be emphasized that an important caveat to
the results derived from this experiment is that the level of innovation is assumed to be
constant.  This restriction limits the ability of this model to fully characterize the welfare
outcome of the TRIPs agreement since only the costs of higher standards of patent protection
can be evaluated but not the potential benefits it achieves through greater innovation.
Compliance with the TRIPs agreement requires all countries to adopt the same broad scope of
protection.
22  This requires that coverage be extended to the pharmaceuticals, food and
chemical industries.  The TRIPs agreement also allows a patent holder to service a market
through imports without fear of revocation of patent rights.
23  Finally, the TRIPs agreement
requires that a basic enforcement infrastructure be erected to allow patent holders to defend25
their intellectual property.
24  The implication of these changes can be approximated by setting




wr) to zero and the enforcement index (PGn) to five.
Under these assumptions, the experiment being conducted is equivalent to asking what would
the present value of patent rights have been for patents applied for in 1988 if all countries
adopted the standards set by the TRIPs agreement in that year.
Table 5 presents the transfers induced by these changes.  The first column sets out the net
transfers associated with the TRIPs agreement, which are defined as the increase in the present
value of patent rights held by residents of a country less the increase in the present value of
patent rights granted by that country in 1988.
25  This column can be used to provide a ranking
of the winners and losers from the TRIPs agreement.  On this basis only six countries stand to
benefit from the TRIPs agreement:  US, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland.  All
other countries experience a net loss from raising their standards of patent protection.  The US
stands out as the major beneficiary, gaining nearly six times as much as the second largest
beneficiary.  Somewhat surprisingly, Canada is the largest loser - over $1 billion - but this is
consistent with Canada’s alignment with developing countries in the negotiation of the TRIPs
agreement (Cottier (1991)).  While the size of Canada’s projected loss is surprising, it is still
plausible.  The potential for this transfer lies in Canada’s proximity, size and shared language
with the US, factors that combine to make Canada the largest trading partner for the US.
However, Canada ranks only fifth in terms of destination for US owned patents.  In addition,
in 1988 US inventors sought only 14,687 patents in Canada while seeking over 75,000
domestically.  In contrast, Canada seeks more patents in the US than any other country
(including Canada itself).  Consequently, the harmonizing of patent standards at a high level of
protection provides ample incentive and opportunity for US inventors to seek patents in26
Canada, without a corresponding opportunity for Canadian inventors.  In particular, the TRIPs
agreement requires Canada to improve the enforcement of patent rights by making
infringement subject to criminal action and by providing for preliminary injunctions to be
granted.  In addition, the requirement that patents granted in Canada be worked in Canada will
be removed under the TRIPs agreement.
Other significant losers are Brazil, UK, India, Mexico, Japan, Spain and Korea.  Of these, the
poor performance of the UK and Japan is somewhat unexpected.  While the estimated net
transfers for both these countries is subject to relatively high standard errors, their ranking is a
reflection of the higher standard of enforcement that TRIPs requires of them.  Prior to the
TRIPs agreement, the UK ranked twenty-fourth on the basis of enforcement, yet still managed
to be the second most popular destination for seeking patents among foreign innovators.
Under the TRIPs agreement the UK will be required to provide for the granting of preliminary
injunctions when infringement of a patent is suspected, along with the reversal of the burden of
proof  in certain cases involving process patents.
26  In addition, the UK is required to make the
infringement of a patent subject to criminal action.  These factors combine to generate a
substantial  increase in the value of UK patent protection, a rise which is not matched by the
increase in value of foreign patents held by UK inventors.  A similar, though less pronounced,
story lies behind the ranking of Japan.  A full breakdown of the net bi-lateral transfers is given
in Table 10.
Table 6 helps to decompose transfers into those associated with a broadening of the scope of
protection and a raising of the enforcement efforts.  Since most countries end up paying, the
focus is on the gross transfers abroad and the share of these transfers attributable to the27
broadening of the scope of protection.  The first column reveals that transfers from developing
countries are generally associated with an increase in the standard of enforcement rather than a
widening of the scope of protection.  For developed countries the relative importance of
transfers deriving from scope or enforcement changes is divided roughly fifty fifty.  Overall,
this breakdown provides some insight into the source of future tensions over intellectual
property protection, especially for developing countries.  Since the transfers from the
developing countries are primarily determined by an increase in enforcement efforts, this
suggests that these countries will be more willing to extend the coverage of patent protection
as required by TRIPs, but may be less willing to devote adequate resources to enforcement.
Hence, future North-South tensions over intellectual property rights are likely to be centered
around enforcement issues rather than the scope of protection offered.
Given the distribution of benefits from patent harmonization, it is interesting to try to evaluate
the relative importance of the TRIPs agreement compared to other aspects of the Uruguay
Round.  There have now been a large number of studies trying to evaluate the benefits of the
Uruguay Round as they relate to liberalization of goods trade.
27  Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7
report the results from a representative study by Harrison et. al. (1995) that was performed on
a sufficiently disaggregated level to enable comparisons to be made at a country level.
28  The
work of Harrison et. al. evaluated the market liberalization consequences of the following
three policy changes:  (i) tariff reductions on manufactured goods; (ii) liberalization of
agricultural protection; and (iii) the elimination of the Multifibre Arrangement.  While caution
should be applied to the interpretation of comparisons made across models, it appears that the
TRIPs agreement does play a prominent role in shaping the outcome of the Uruguay Round.
29
Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates of Harrison et. al. net of the transfers implied by TRIPs.28
Taking account of the TRIPs agreement, the US finds that its gains from the Uruguay Round
are substantially enhanced by patent harmonization (an increase of 40% in the short run and
increase of 20% in the long run).  For Mexico, Canada and Brazil patent harmonization also
plays a large role in determining the outcome of the Uruguay Round.  All of these countries
now find that the Uruguay Round is of questionable benefit in the short run and that patent
harmonization reduces substantially the magnitude of any long run gains.
A related issue is the impact that patent harmonization has on the dead weight loss associated
with the granting of patents.  However, due to the assumptions relating to market structure,
markups are independent of intellectual property rights (i.e. the price of the input employing
the new technology is the same both before and after imitation).  Nevertheless an
approximation to the increase in dead weight loss associated with the TRIPs agreement may
be gained by decomposing the dead weight loss in a similar way to that employed to isolate the
rents appropriated from patent protection (as opposed to other appropriation mechanisms).
Therefore, the dead weight loss can be decomposed and attributed to:  patent protection, other
appropriation mechanisms and the market power that an imitator possesses (see section 3.2).
The calculation of the dead weight loss follows directly from the assumptions on market
structure and the limit pricing strategy that it implies for a patent holder.  In this limit pricing
equilibrium the dead weight loss is defined as the difference between the surplus appropriated
by the patent holder and the surplus when the invention is freely available (i.e. the price of the
input produced with the new technology is wn rather than e
qwn
The “increase” in dead weight loss attributable to enhanced patent protection as a result of the29
TRIPs agreement is reported in the first column of Table 8.  This column is constructed by
subtracting the dead weight loss attributable to patents under the pre-TRIPs regime from the
dead weight loss attributable to patents under TRIPs.
30  Combining the dead weight loss and
transfers gives a more detailed welfare characterization of the TRIPs agreement (see second
column, Table 8).  The incorporation of dead weight loss exacerbates the losses experienced
by those countries which make net transfers, while undermining the size of the benefits for
those that gain.  Indeed, both Sweden and Switzerland experience a dead weight loss greater
than the net transfers from patent harmonization.  In aggregate, the dead weight loss totals
over $17.5 billion, which represents roughly one fifth of the efficiency gains that have been
calculated to flow from the trade liberalization program of the Uruguay Round.
One factor that might mitigate such negative conclusions is that higher standards of patent
protection may induce greater innovation.  As mentioned above, the calculations reported do
not account for any response of innovation to the TRIPs agreement.  While there is reason to
suspect that higher standards of patent protection and innovation may not necessarily be
positively related (see Helpman (1993)), there is a general expectation that innovation will
increase.  Since the production of inventions is not directly modeled, the results of this paper
can not be used to clarify this issue.  Nevertheless, some insight may be gained from examining
the returns to innovation under the TRIPs institutions.  Table 9 provides information on the
returns to R&D from patent harmonization.  The first column reports the increase in the value
of patent holding by the residents of each country, while the third and fourth columns put the
increase in rent appropriating ability into perspective.  The third column shows that each
country expects a substantial increase in the value of patent holdings, with a mean increase in
the value of rights of 60%.  The fourth column translates these enhanced values into ratios of30
R&D expenditures.  The most pronounced increases in these ratios are for Australia and
Switzerland, rising from 22% to 39% and from 24% to 36% respectively.  For all other
countries these ratios remain below one quarter after TRIPs is implemented.  However,
whether or not the change in R&D incentive is sufficient to generate a substantial increase in
innovation is unclear.  No firm conclusions can be drawn without modeling the process of
innovation itself, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, the last column of  Table 9 looks at the share of rents from abroad under TRIPs
institutions.  The most interesting aspect of this column is that the major technology producers
(US, France, Germany, Japan and Italy) will become more dependent on returns from abroad.
If, as Diwan and Rodrik (1991) have argued, countries have different preferences over the
types of R&D projects initiated, then some of the countries may experience some offsetting
efficiency gains through the creation of innovations more closely related to their needs.  For
instance, an increase in the value of pharmaceutical patents in developing countries may
generate increased R&D on drugs dealing with tropical diseases.  However, further
consideration of these issues is outside of the scope of this paper.
8. Conclusion
This paper extends the analysis of the Uruguay Round by quantifying the impact of
international patent harmonization as implied by the TRIPs agreement.  What emerges from
this analysis is a picture of patent protection as an important method for appropriating the
rents of an invention.   Although it is not the primary method of rent appropriation, patent
harmonization has the capacity to generate large transfers of income between countries, with
the US being the major beneficiary.  The developing countries are not alone in financing31
transfers, with Canada, UK and Japan also making sizable contributions.  These transfers
significantly alter the perceived distribution of benefits from the Uruguay Round, with the US
benefits substantially enhanced, while those of developing countries and Canada considerably
diminished.  Furthermore, accounting for the increase in dead weight loss from higher
standards of patent protection undermines the aggregate benefits of the Uruguay Round
package, with the increase in dead weight loss amounting to as much as one fifth of the
efficiency gains from trade liberalization.  However, dynamic efficiency gains from increased
innovation may go some way to offsetting the increase in dead weight loss, which is an issue
for future research.
A number of restrictive assumptions were made when deriving the estimates of this paper.  In
particular, the model precluded from consideration both the role of trade in patented inputs
and the role of multinationals.  By precluding trade in inputs, possible efficiency enhancing
aspects of the TRIPs agreement may have been overlooked.  If an inventor finds that the
requirement to produce locally is accompanied by an increase in costs, which may be the case
if there are increasing returns to scale in production, then there will be additional efficiency
gains under TRIPs from the removal of “working requirements”.  This may go some way to
offsetting the large dead weight loss estimated to be associated with the TRIPs agreement.  On
the other hand, the inclusion of multinationals may have a more ambiguous effect on the
predicted outcome.  The modeling of multinationals would allow the link between foreign
direct investment and technology transfer to be studied more directly.  In particular, the
concern that developing countries have expressed over the removal of the working
requirement can be evaluated.  Their concern is that without a local production requirement,
multinationals will only set up plants to assemble imported components, thereby reducing both32
the amount of technology transferred and the spill-over benefits associated with that
technology.  Such an effect will further undermine the productivity differential and has
implications for both the distribution of income and global efficiency.
Finally, this paper only manages a partial welfare appraisal of the TRIPs agreement since
innovation is assumed to be exogenous.  By endogenizing innovation, the optimal rate of
innovation can be derived, and an assessment made about the potential for the TRIPs
agreement to move the world closer to this optimum.33
Appendix
31
To solve the model begin by defining:
mn = An
w
This implies  n n n
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Under a wide range of parameter values this system has a single, strictly positive eigenvalue,
l
F, with a corresponding eigenvector, m









F.  This allows the
range of inputs, J, to be calibrated, conditonal on all the estimated parameters, to achieve the
desired growth rate, g (i.e. J = l



















.  Using this index and the parameter values the predicted bi-
lateral patenting behavior is:
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The errors are then given by
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The objective function is to minimize u’u + su
2/sv
2 (v’Wv
-1v) where Wv = [IN-1 + eN-1e’N-1] and
eN-1 is a N-1 vector of ones.  Estimation employs a two step feasible generalized nonlinear least




v.  This first step yields
consistent but not efficient parameter estimates.  To obtain efficient estimates the residuals are
used to calculate estimates of  $ s u
2 and  $ s v
2 which are then used in the minimization routine.
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Footnotes
                                                       
1 See McCalman (1997) and Diwan and Rodrik (1991).  Other work on the TRIPs agreement includes the
static models of Chin and Grossman (1990), Deardorff (1992), and the dynamic general equilibrium model of
Helpman (1993).
2 The presentation of the model will be brief, a more detailed exposition can be found in Eaton and Kortum
(1996).
3 The J parameter serves a number of purposes in this model.  First, it determines the extent to which a given
improvement in an input contributes to output growth (i.e. a higher J implies a smaller aggregate effect).
Second, it allows the rate of obsolescence to be derived in a straight forward manner (see (3)). Finally, it
provides an extra degree of freedom when estimating the model (see footnote 17).
4 See Levin et. al. (1987).
5 This contract is not subject to a double marginalization problem due to the limit pricing strategy which is
adopted by the licensee in the intermediate input market.  By setting the per unit license fee in this way, the
patent holder can extract all the rents from the innovation, provided it has not been imitated.
6 For details on the different treatment of the hazard of imitation see footnote 16.
7 This specification is consistent with the model developed above as the type of input to which an invention
applies is assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution.
8 Modeling a domestic working requirement in this way is admittedly ad hoc.  To analyze the role of this
restriction requires a model which includes a choice over how a market is served (licensing, exports or direct
investment).
9 There is a possible endogeniety problem here since it may be the case that chemicals are not offered patent
protection because there are no domestic chemical innovations to be patented or there are no domestic
chemical innovations to patent because there is no domestic patent protection.  However, as detailed in Levin
et. al. (1987) and Mansfield (1986), although patents are part of an innovators rent appropriation strategy, they
are not the primary instrument for appropriating rents.  Therefore, if a country wanted to create a domestic
chemical R&D sector it would need to do more than simply provide patent protection for chemical innovations.
Assuming that no chemical innovations implies no patent protection for chemicals does contradict the
assumption that innovations are distributed uniformly across the J inputs.  Nevertheless, countries which36
                                                                                                                                                                           
exclude industries can still experience improvements in quality across all J inputs.
10 Eaton and Kortum estimate the same two equations with the exception that the introduction of extra
information on national patent institutions in this paper alters the definition of fni and introduces the scope
parameter, sni.
11 The system was also estimated using a Tobit specification for the patenting equation.  This produced almost
identical point estimates to the procedure used by Eaton and Kortum.
12 I would like to thank Lise Mcleod of WIPO for supplying the additional data.
13 Following Eaton and Kortum (1996) the data from Japanese domestic application has been adjusted to
account for the idiosyncratic domestic patenting of the Japanese.  The adjustment involves translating 4.9
Japanese domestic patent applications to be equivalent to one from somewhere else.
14 I would like to thank Walter Park for providing these data.
15 This measure of human capital differs from that used in Eaton and Kortum and was adopted due to its wider
country coverage.
16 The treatment of the foreign hazard of imitation follows that of Eaton and Kortum, while the domestic
hazard is calculated differently.  It was decided for the sake of consistency that foreign and domestic imitation
parameters would be taken from comparable sources.  Eaton and Kortum chose to set foreign imitation rates
based on Mansfield and Romeo (1980) and attempted to estimate the domestic imitation rate.  While this
proved unsuccessful, they concluded from their experience that the domestic imitation rate should be set at a
large number.  Similarly I tried to estimate this rate but found that the estimated value became arbitrarily
small.  Ultimately it was decided that unless both imitation rates could be estimated, the most satisfactory
solution is to set both consistently (i.e. derived from a comparable methodology).
17 At each iteration of the model during the estimation routine, growth is constrained to equal 2.8%.  This is
achieved by calibrating the J parameter, conditional on all the estimated parameters, to generate a growth rate
of 2.8% (see Appendix for details).
18 See Levin et. al. (1987).
19 The static models of Maskus, Subrumanian and others do not allow for alternative rent appropriating
methods and equate market power solely with the existance of patent protection.
20 For OECD countries the R&D numbers are for 1988.  The remaining numbers are for years other than 1988,37
                                                                                                                                                                           
although they have been converted to 1988 dollars.  See the Footnote on Table 3 for source information.
21 The breakdown reported in column 3 differs substantially from that reported in Eaton and Kortum (1995).
This discrepancy is attributable primarily to the different domestic hazard of imitation used in this paper
compared to Eaton and Kortum.  See footnote 16 for further discussion of this .
22 See TRIPs Article 27(2) and (3).
23 See TRIPs Article 27(1).
24 On term of protection see Article 33, for burden of proof see Article 34(1), injunctions see Article 44 and
criminal procedures see Article 61.
25 France and Italy are the only countries which do not increase the value of the patents rights they grant, since
based on the measures of patent protection used in this paper their standards were in compliance with TRIPs in
1988.
26 The burden of proof is typically on the plaintiff, a requirement which becomes particularly onerous in cases
involving process patents since the plaintiff usually is not privy to the exact production process employed by a
competitor.  However, the TRIPs agreement allows this burden of proof to be reversed in certain situations (see
Article 34(1)).
27 See Francois et. al. (1995) for a survey
28 The short run setting reported by Harrison et. al and reported in Table 5 refers to a situation in which the
capital stock is fixed.  In contrast, the long run outcome allows for the capital stock to be adjusted in response
to changes in relative prices.  This long run outcome ignores adjustment costs and therefore serves as an upper
bound on the welfare gains of the Uruguay Round.
29 One precaution that has been taken is the selection of a study that reports simulations for 1992, which are
then discounted to 1988 to make the numbers comparable.  Other studies report implications for 2005 when
the Uruguay Round will be fully implemented, which includes the benefits of projected growth between 1992
and then.
30 Note that the increase in the present value of the dead wieght loss comes from the inceased tenure of the
patent holder as technology leader since higher standards of patent protection reduce the hazard of imitation.
31 I would like to thank Sam Kortum for supplying the Gauss code from Eaton and Kortum.  Aside from the
modifications cited already, the numerical routine was changed from the amoeba algorithm to the routines38
                                                                                                                                                                           
contained within optmum.Table 1









US 75,633 69,097 177,529 0 0 0 0 4.00
Japan (JP) 63,053 35,219 96,952 0 0 0 0 3.75
Germany (GE) 31,981 51,140 117,131 0 0 0 0 4.00
UK 20,903 58,448 47,353 0 0 0 0 2.00
France (FR) 12,438 52,343 47,822 0 0 0 0 5.00
Australia (AL) 6,573 15,399 10,567 0 0 0 0 2.80
Korea (KR) 5,699 11,618 897 1 1 1 0 4.75
South Africa (ZA) 4,829 4,870 1,323 0 0 0 1 3.00
Israel (IL) 4,829 2,835 2,223 0 0 0 1 3.00
Sweden (SW) 3,413 34,076 16,872 0 0 0 0 4.00
Switzerland (SWI) 3,251 33,151 25,483 0 0 0 1 3.90
Canada (CA) 2,773 28,295 8,780 0 0 0 1 3.00
Brazil (BR) 2,343 9,803 508 1 1 1 1 0.75
Italy (IT) 2,290 41,900 22,454 0 0 0 0 5.00
Austria (AU) 2,228 29,626 6,578 0 0 0 1 4.00
Netherlands (NL) 2,162 37,667 18,879 0 0 0 1 5.00
Finland (FI) 2,039 7,191 6,160 1 1 0 1 4.00
Spain (SP) 1,817 23,963 2,526 1 0 1 0 4.00
Denmark (DK) 1,332 9,693 5,923 0 1 0 1 4.00
India (IN) 1,034 2,737 134 1 1 1 1 2.00
Norway (NOR) 929 8,400 2,600 1 1 0 1 4.00
New Zealand (NZ) 804 3,607 711 0 0 0 1 2.80
Mexico (MX) 733 4,459 177 1 1 1 1 1.82
Ireland (IR) 728 3,157 921 0 0 0 1 0.80
Belgium (BE) 637 32,377 5,663 0 0 0 1 4.00
Greece (GR) 375 13,118 223 1 0 0 1 2.75
Columbia (CO) 85 195 178 1 1 0 1 2.50
Portugal (PT) 55 2,407 156 1 1 1 1 2.88
Panama (PA) 10 60 128 0 0 0 1 1.88a Patent applications by residents of each country for 1988 in 1000s, from WIPO (1990) and unpublished
data.
b Applications from residents of other 28 countries.
c Applications by residents of a given country for patent protection in one of the other 28 countries.
d Dummy variable which is assigned a value of one if the sector is excluded from patent protection in a
given country, WIPO (1988).
e Dummy variable which is assigned a value of one if the granting of a patent is associated with a
requirement that the patent be worked within the country, Baxter and Sinott (1989).
f  An index ranging from zero to five which summarizes the national enforcement institutions associated
with patent protection, adpated from Ginarte and Park.Table 2
Estimated Parameters
Description Symbol Estimate Std. Error
Enforcement Parameter g   0.03 0.004
Pharmaceutical Coverage s
ph   0.19 0.124
Food Coverage s
fd   0.51 0.071
Chemical Coverage s
ch   0.03 0.148 u’u 795.60
Working Requirement s
im   0.48 0.049 v’Wv
-1v 1.201
Step Size Parameter q   3.73 0.782
Catch Up Parameter w  34.93 75.12
Mistaken Patents h   0.02 0.004 Number of
Import effect on Diffusion eimp   0.15 0.043 observations 869
Human Capital effect on Diffusion ehk   3.67 0.687
Home bias of Diffusion edom   1.21 0.245





Squared Distance Effect ekm2   0.001 0.0002
Innovation Co-efficient,Australia aal   9.76 0.291
Innovation Co-efficient,Austria aas   8.21 0.306
Innovation Co-efficient,Belgium abe   7.99 0.263
Innovation Co-efficient,Canada aca   8.12 0.279
Innovation Co-efficient,Denmark adn   8.01 0.302
Innovation Co-efficient,Finland afi   8.12 0.306
Innovation Co-efficient,France afr 10.00 0.244
Innovation Co-efficient,Germany age 10.40 0.218
Innovation Co-efficient,Greece agr   5.10 0.367
Innovation Co-efficient,Ireland air   6.38 0.330
Innovation Co-efficient,Italy ait   9.39 0.257
Innovation Co-efficient,Japan ajp 10.26 0.223
Innovation Co-efficient,Netherland ane   9.10 0.256
Innovation Co-efficient,New Zealnd anz   7.19 0.303
Innovation Co-efficient,Norway anr   7.04 0.370
Innovation Co-efficient,Protugal apr   4.53 0.366
Innovation Co-efficient,Spain asp   7.41 0.300
Innovation Co-efficient,Sweden asw   9.03 0.272
Innovation Co-efficient,Switzerland aswi   9.56 0.265
Innovation Co-efficient,U.K. auk   9.87 0.234
Innovation Co-efficient, U.S. aus 11.03 0.193
Innovation Co-efficient,Brazil abr   6.37 0.340
Innovation Co-efficient,India ain   4.84 0.403
Innovation Co-efficient,Mexico amx   4.84 0.364
Innovation Co-efficient,Panama apa   4.66 0.535
Innovation Co-efficient,Columbia aco   5.36 0.389
Innovation Co-efficient,Korea akr   5.53 0.320
Innovation Co-efficient,South Africa aza   8.08 0.336
Innovation Co-efficient,Israel ail   7.72 0.326        Table 3
$US Millions 1988
























South Africa 24 (1)
Ireland 17 (4)









a Derived using the delta methodTable 4
PV of Patent Rents
R&D Expenditure
a


























South Africanada NA 0.81




a The R&D variable is expenditure by business enterprises.  The numbers for AL, BE, CA, FI, FR, GE,
GR, IR, IT, JP, NL, PT, SP and US are for 1988, taken from Table 21 OECD (1994).  The remaining
numbers are taken from Table 4 of UNESCO (1993).Table 5
$US Million 1988




































Percentage of Gross Transfer
from Broader Scope
Canada 1107 (374) 0.41
UK 1044 (349) 0.00
Brazil 930 (205. 0.11
Japan 896 (659) 0.00
India 526 (102) 0.34
Mexico 445 (125) 0.29
Germany 384 (379) 0.00
Spain 367 (148) 0.45
Korea 328 (55) 0.92
Netherlands 313 (119) 1.00
Belgium 293 (84) 0.64
Switzerland 288 (100) 0.60
Finland 238 (52) 0.73
Austria 229 (65) 0.64
Denmark 227 (53) 0.68
Norway 226 (47) 0.71
Australia 166 (26) 0.00
South Africa 123 (13) 0.40
Greece 119 (25) 0.35
Sweden 104 (59) 0.00
Israel 89 (21) 0.32
Portugal 87 (16) 0.34
Columbia 78 (19) 0.37
US 73 (163) 0.00
New Zealand 60 (8) 0.27
Ireland 58 (14) 0.00
France 0 (0) 0.00
Italy 0 (0) 0.00
Panama 0 (0) 0.00Table 7
$US Millions 1988
     Gains From Trade           Gains from Trade Liberalization
         Liberalization                  Net of TRIPs Transfer
Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Australia 1,017 2,745 994 2,722
EU 33,117 42,020 32,768 41,671
Canada 1,088 2,199 65 1,176
Japan 14,220 19,127 13,780 18,688
New Zealand 336 1,204 281 1,149
US 11,185 22,458 15,738 27,011
Brazil 1,215 3,593 288 2,666
South Asia* 3,130 5,677 2,604 5,151
Mexico 129 1,931 -316 1,486




Footnotes: Columns (1) and (2) adapted from Harrison et. al. (1995)
*South Asia includes a number of countries other than India.  However, the efficiency








US 682 (127) 3870 (869)
France 0 (0) 568 (117)
Germany 504 (130) 284 (360)
Italy 0 (0) 231 (47)
Panama 0 (0) 0.3 (0.1)
Sweden 142 (28) -71 (54)
Ireland 126 (25) -174 (32)
New Zealand 154 (19) -209 (29)
Israel 176 (32) -242 (41)
Portugal 217 (37) -304 (44)
Columbia 258 (36) -335 (46)
Greece 218 (40) -336 (52)
Switzerland 363 (90) -340 (149)
Australia 410 (78) -433 (89)
Netherlands 377 (98) -473 (153)
Denmark 331 (68) -505 (92)
Austria 334 (72) -510 (99)
Norway 349 (67) -555 (88)
South Africa 453 (74) -567 (90)
Finland 377 (73) -575 (96)
Belgium 351 (81) -576 (115)
Spain 626 (188) -971 (282)
Korea 753 (124) -1079 (165)
Mexico 1023 (140) -1467 (195)
Uk 1434 (315) -1975 (475)
Canada 1305 (234) -2328 (382)
Japan 2256 (531) -2695 (724)
India 2405 (341) -2931 (395)
Brazil 2021 (274) -2948 (388)
Total 17656 (2981)
*Standard errors in parenthesis, derived using the delta methodTable 9
Change in Value of Patent
Rents due to TRIPs
Std. error
% Change in Value PV of Patent Rents (TRIPs)
R&D Expenditure
Share of Patent Rents
from Abroad under
TRIPs
US 7168 (1196) 0.47 0.23 0.45
GE 1488 (293) 0.48 0.19 0.67
JP 1342 (198) 0.53 0.07 0.24
UK 872 (169) 0.71 0.18 0.71
FR 568 (117) 0.37 0.16 0.65
SWI 339 (68) 0.49 0.36 0.91
IT 231 (47) 0.35 0.15 0.62
AL 221 (52) 0.74 0.39 0.68
NL 217 (44) 0.47 0.22 0.89
SW 191 (39) 0.61 0.16 0.91
CA 113 (22) 0.63 0.08 0.76
BE 73 (14) 0.51 0.12 0.92
AU 56 (11) 0.48 0.18 0.9
DK 56 (11) 0.54 0.18 0.97
FI 43 (9) 0.47 0.12 0.94
SP 27 (5) 0.46 0.06 0.77
IL 25 (5) 0.62 0.08 0.94
NOR 20 (4) 0.52 0.08 0.96
BR 14 (3) 1.54 NA 0.48
ZA 14 (1) 0.58 NA 0.76
CO 13 (0.3) 0.66 NA 0.98
IR 9 (2. 0.57 0.18 0.99
NZ 7 (2) 0.66 NA 0.93
KR 3 (0.7) 0.4 0.004 0.82
GR 2 (0.3) 0.47 0.09 0.96
MX 2 (0.4) 0.74 0.0002 0.8
PT 1 (0.2) 0.47 0.05 0.98
IN 1 (0.3) 0.87 0.00 0.5
PA 0 (0.1) 0.72 NA 1Table10
NET Transfers implied by Patent Harmonization
$US Millions, 1988
 
Country of Residence of Patent Holder
AL AU BE CA DK FI FR GE GR IR IT JP NL NZ NOR PT SP SW SWI UK US BR IN MX PA CO KR ZA IL
AL 0 -1.85 -1.77 -3.45 -1.12 -2.16 9.08 12.51 -1.53 -0.58 11.44 -10.9 0.01 -5.29 -1.91 -1 -4.25 1.08 0.83 -4.9 80.62 -15.4 -16.4 -3.28 0 -0.6 -11.9 -3.47 -0.87
AU 1.85 0 0.1 0.43 0.71 -0.1 20.28 56.8 -1.34 0.24 10.64 1.96 5.71 -0.11 -0.84 -0.61 -2.09 5.76 13.27 11.7 62.88 -3.54 -4.77 -0.75 0 -0.17 -1.36 -0.59 0.22
BE 1.77 -0.1 0 0.27 0.42 -0.36 32.5 56.98 -1.29 0.24 10.27 2.38 9.27 -0.25 -1.39 -0.85 -2.99 6.07 12.64 16.3 96.08 -4.34 -5.45 -1.04 0 -0.22 -1.4 -0.64 -0.05
CA 3.45 -0.43 -0.27 0 -0.47 -0.83 14.72 28.55 -0.87 -0.45 5.33 41.85 3.67 -0.46 -1.41 -0.81 -2.6 3.72 5.32 8.3 943.8 -11 -5.09 -5.45 0 -0.89 -3.4 -0.93 -0.08
DK 1.12 -0.71 -0.42 0.47 0 -0.84 16.71 47.58 -1.05 0.18 5.85 1.85 4.76 -0.19 -1.57 -0.66 -2.17 6.84 8.17 11.21 85.93 -3.46 -3.96 0.02 0 -0.23 -0.59 -0.79 -0.06
FI 2.16 0.1 0.36 0.83 0.84 0 18.52 47.04 -0.88 0.29 6.72 3.12 6.13 -0.09 -0.75 -0.49 -0.71 9.98 9.09 14.58 85.25 -3.05 0.01 0.02 0 -0.19 -0.17 -0.79 0.14
FR -9.08 -20.3 -32.5 -14.7 -16.7 -18.5 0 -40.7 -11.1 -1.52 0 -40.9 -30.9 -3.01 -19 -8.34 -39.4 -8.56 -28.3 -109 -6.23 -37.6 -37.6 -5.41 0 -2.08 -13.7 -8.29 -5.77
GE -12.5 -56.8 -57 -28.6 -47.6 -47 40.72 0 -27.2 -5.09 16.36 -85.5 -54.4 -6.19 -48.5 -15.3 -61.4 -8.61 -36.4 -165 167 -82.3 -81.6 -17.7 0 -5.62 -30.7 -18.3 -13.9
GR 1.53 1.34 1.29 0.87 1.05 0.88 11.14 27.17 0 0.16 6.6 4.06 3.99 0.07 0.43 0 0.4 3.13 6.12 10.35 36.63 -0.13 0 0 0 -0.01 -0.02 0.18 0.77
IR 0.58 -0.24 -0.24 0.45 -0.18 -0.29 1.52 5.09 -0.16 0 0.28 -0.4 0.2 -0.03 -0.27 -0.14 -0.55 0.27 0.57 6.75 36.55 -0.65 0 0 0 -0.05 -0.24 -0.12 0.04
IT -11.4 -10.6 -10.3 -5.33 -5.85 -6.72 0 -16.4 -6.6 -0.28 0 -16.2 -10.9 -2.64 -5.55 -2.56 -14.8 -3.35 -12.1 -34.9 -2.2 -16.9 -19.6 -2.98 0 -0.78 -5.63 -3.94 -2.97
JP 10.92 -1.96 -2.38 -41.9 -1.85 -3.12 40.92 85.5 -4.06 0.4 16.21 0 8.52 -3.02 -4.56 -7.15 -32 12.33 16.03 14.57 543.7 -52.4 -64.4 -11.4 0 -2.21 -68.9 -7.68 -0.81
NL -0.01 -5.71 -9.27 -3.67 -4.76 -6.13 30.9 54.37 -3.99 -0.2 10.89 -8.52 0 -0.94 -7.48 -2.86 -11.1 4.44 7.26 -8.9 104.9 -15.2 -14.4 -3.07 0 -0.91 -5.39 -2.76 -1.55
NZ 5.29 0.11 0.25 0.46 0.19 0.09 3.01 6.19 -0.07 0.03 2.64 3.02 0.94 0 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12 0.73 1.47 3.57 27.59 -0.66 0 -0.16 0 0 -0.32 -0.03 0.18
NOR 1.91 0.84 1.39 1.41 1.57 0.75 19.01 48.45 -0.43 0.27 5.55 4.56 7.48 0.01 0 -0.22 -0.08 8.37 9.14 20.22 79.09 -1.22 -1.36 -0.27 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.19 0.36
PT 1 0.61 0.85 0.81 0.66 0.49 8.34 15.32 0 0.14 2.56 7.15 2.86 0.05 0.22 0 0.44 2.08 4.25 8.46 30.6 -0.03 0 -0.01 0 0 0.01 0.07 0.22
SP 4.25 2.09 2.99 2.6 2.17 0.71 39.44 61.38 -0.4 0.55 14.78 32.01 11.09 0.12 0.08 -0.44 0 7.38 18.14 31.18 118.7 -2.11 -1.79 -0.54 0.04 -0.08 -0.52 0.23 0.97
SW -1.08 -5.76 -6.07 -3.72 -6.84 -9.98 8.56 8.61 -3.13 -0.27 3.35 -12.3 -4.44 -0.73 -8.37 -2.08 -7.38 0 -1.77 -18.8 37.02 -11.2 -12.9 -2.07 0 -0.74 -5.19 -2.43 -1.63
SWI -0.83 -13.3 -12.6 -5.32 -8.17 -9.09 28.34 36.36 -6.12 -0.57 12.07 -16 -7.26 -1.47 -9.14 -4.25 -18.1 1.77 0 -28.1 104 -20.2 -22.6 -4.14 0.02 -1.27 -7.6 -4.88 -4.18
UK 4.9 -11.7 -16.3 -8.3 -11.2 -14.6 108.6 164.8 -10.4 -6.75 34.87 -14.6 8.9 -3.57 -20.2 -8.46 -31.2 18.77 28.08 0 444.9 -37.5 -41.1 -8.33 0 -2.06 -14.6 -7.78 -4
US -80.6 -62.9 -96.1 -944 -85.9 -85.3 6.23 -167 -36.6 -36.6 2.2 -544 -105 -27.6 -79.1 -30.6 -119 -37 -104 -445 0 -604 -189 -378 0.03 -59.3 -155 -51.7 -39.1
BR 15.44 3.54 4.34 10.97 3.46 3.05 37.58 82.3 0.13 0.65 16.89 52.41 15.19 0.66 1.22 0.03 2.11 11.15 20.19 37.46 604.2 0 0.05 0.01 0 0.31 0.25 1.67 1.67
IN 16.4 4.77 5.45 5.09 3.96 -0.01 37.55 81.55 0 0 19.58 64.36 14.36 0 1.36 0 1.79 12.88 22.64 41.09 189.2 -0.05 0 -0.01 0 0 0.35 0 3.74
MX 3.28 0.75 1.04 5.45 -0.02 -0.02 5.41 17.72 0 0 2.98 11.43 3.07 0.16 0.27 0.01 0.54 2.07 4.14 8.33 378 -0.01 0.01 0 0.09 0.09 0.05 0 -0.01
PA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.02 0 -0.04 0 -0.02 0 -0.03 0 0 -0.09 0 -0.03 -0.05 0 -0.01
CO 0.6 0.17 0.22 0.89 0.23 0.19 2.08 5.62 0.01 0.05 0.78 2.21 0.91 0 0.07 0 0.08 0.74 1.27 2.06 59.34 -0.31 0 -0.09 0.03 0 0 0 0.1
KR 11.89 1.36 1.4 3.4 0.59 0.17 13.68 30.69 0.02 0.24 5.63 68.88 5.39 0.32 0.05 -0.01 0.52 5.19 7.6 14.58 155.1 -0.25 -0.35 -0.05 0.05 0 0 0 -0.02
ZA 3.47 0.59 0.64 0.93 0.79 0.79 8.29 18.28 -0.18 0.12 3.94 7.68 2.76 0.03 0.19 -0.07 -0.23 2.43 4.88 7.78 51.68 -1.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.43
IL 0.87 -0.22 0.05 0.08 0.06 -0.14 5.77 13.92 -0.77 -0.04 2.97 0.81 1.55 -0.18 -0.36 -0.22 -0.97 1.63 4.18 4 39.1 -1.67 -3.74 0.01 0.01 -0.1 0.02 -0.43 0